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Associative Memory and Pattern Classification
If an associative memory is trained on a set of patterns {Pi} and then exposed to a novel pattern P*, it will usually map the new pattern to the closest P,. In matrix autoassociators such as Hopfield nets or Anderson *s "brain state in a box* 9 model, any subset of the pattern can serve as the cue for retrieving the whole. These models contain recurrent connections, so their behavior is described by differential equations and they typically require several iterations to settle into a stable state. Their memories are fixedpoints of a dynamical system. A second family of associative memory models permits only feed-forward connections; the weights are learned by backward error propagation or the perceptron learning rule. Feedforward models can acquire much wider sets of memories than matrix models, by using intermediate or "hidden" units to recode the input as necessary [12] . A hetero-associator which maps an input pattern /, to an output pattern 0, can be viewed as an auto-associator in which Pi = (/,. O t ) and P* * (/*. 0).
A third family of associative models, which includes competitive learning and adaptive resonance networks, maintains a prototype for each learned class. A prototype is represented by the connections made to a dedicated unit. Novel inputs are associated with the prototype whose unit they excite most strongly. Learning new prototypes requires recruiting new units. What NETtalk actually learns is a set of 26 binary decision problems, which it solves in parallel. However, since the 26 output units share the same set of hidden units, and certain conflations exist among the outputs (e.g., the articulatory features LABIAL and VELAR are mutually exclusive), the 26 classification problems aren't learned independently.
Lapedes and Farber have shown that back propagation can learn to predict the behavior of very complex (chaotic) functions with better accuracy than previous numerical techniques [7] . Function approximation by back propagation is especially promising for control problems, such as predicting the dynamics of a robot arm from a collection of actual trajectories.
One of the interesting properties of back propagation is that the hidden units evolve to detect regularities in the input space. Hinton's work on learning the structure of family trees offers a particularly striking example of this effect [5] . But the regularities the network discovers are not accessible to introspection; the network cannot reason about what it has learned. For example, the network has no way to compare the regularities discovered in one group of input units with those discovered in other groups. 
Pattern Transformation by Multilayer Perceptrons
Why Associative Memory Is Insufficient
The triumph of associative models is that they provide evidence in support of the connectionist hypothesis that problems that appear to require sequential, symbolic inference may be amenable to parallel solution by some sort of continuous dynamical system [15] . But the evidence is only suggestive. No one should believe that human-like cognitive mechanisms are efficiently constructive by back propagation. Rule-following behavior can be successfully approximated by back propagation networks only when the behavior is relatively simple (no combinatorial structure), or the training data coven most of fee input space, as in Allen's language translation experiment. In other words, the brute force associative approach to intelligence doesn't scale.
In focusing on simple, trainabie pattern recognition machines, connectionists appear to be ducking the hard problems in cognition, as critics of the approach have been quick to point out. These problems include:
• The compositional structure of language [4] . People's ability to correctly interpret novel sentences composed of familiar words, and to put words together in novel ways, cannot be reduced to learning correlations between input and output patterns in a back propagation network -unless the training set is near-exhaustive.
• The need to express complex relations between objects, as in Drew McDermott's "she is more outgoing with her fellow graduate students than with me, her advisor" [9] . The ability to relate concepts not previously juxtaposed is part of what distinguishes inference from mere associative recall.
• The need for variables and variable binding [11] . Constraints imposed by certain uses of variable binding may well be the primary serializing constraint on cognition [10] , but variable binding is nonetheless essential for retrieving and applying knowledge. Variable binding cannot be replaced by associative memory unless one trains on virtually all the variable values in advance.
There have been some attempts at addressing these problems by designing specialized network architectures. These include Touretzky and Hinton's distributed connectionist production system, DCPS [ [17] . These models did not evolve by subjecting a network with random initial weights to voluminous amounts of training data. They were designed methodically, using such techniques as coarse coding, lateral inhibition, and simulated annealing search to produce particular sorts of symbol processing behavior.
Another Cognitive Primitive
In this last section of the paper I will focus on a simple cognitive primitive, "appropriate substitution," that highlights the failure of the simple associative approach, but I believe is ripe for connectionist implementation. Consider the linguistic phenomenon known as metonymy, in which one concept plays the part of another. An example taken from Lakoff [6] is the waitress What John actually cut was neither the apple nor the tree, but rather the stem that connected the apple to the tree. To correctly understand (2) one first needs a way of detecting that the unique selectional restrictions created by the combination of "cut" and "from die tree" are not met by the direct object "apple." This motivates a search for something related to "apple" -in an appropriate way -that could substitute for it as the patient in the cut act. The problem is complicated by the fact that the meanings of the other words in the sentence aren't fixed In particular, "cut" is a polysemous verb: its meanings include sever, section, slice, stab, excise, dilute, diminish, traverse, and move quickly.
Comprehending (2) requires the knowledge that apples are connected to trees by steins, and one of the senses of cut is to sever a connection. Metonymy clearly involves some sort of associative faculty, but not the simple retrieval described earlier. One does not want to map apple to stem in all contexts. Apple certainly doesn't mean stem in either of these sentences: (3) John ate an apple from the tree. The domain of metonymic reference is so rich that one cannot hope to cover the space with a simple associative memory, except by using the entire sentence as context and training on an exponential number of examples. But a hand-designed metonymy tnarhin* -one that can dynamically bring together the bits of knowledge it needs -should be able to interpret truly novel metonymic references without exhaustive training. Even though it might never have considered cutting anything like a mooring rope before, a metonymy machine should have no trouble inferring what is severed in (5) John cut the boat from the dock.
In my lab at Carnegie Mellon we have begun working on the design of such a metonymy machine.
